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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN TANGARO, d.b.a TANGARO 
LOAN AND JEWELRY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant_, 
vs. 
AUGUSTINE LOPEZ MARRERO, 
JACINTO RENEEN (RIVERA) 
and E'T ANGELINE LOPEZ, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 9603 
This was an action to recover the balance of $1,083.50 
claimed by plaintiffs remaining unpaid on a promissory 
note executed on April 26, 1957 by the defendants 
Augustine Lopez Marreo and his wife, Evangeline 
Lopez, in favor of the plaintiff. 'fhe defendant, Jacinto 
Rivera, was a co-signer and received no benefits there-
from. The note provided for payments at the rate of 
$50.00 on each payday of Marrero, which came every 
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two weeks. Marrero was employed by Kennecott Cop-
per Corporation at· Bingham Canyon, Utah, and at 
the time of the execution of the note worked five days 
each week. Payments were made regularly in the sum 
of $50.00 until March, 1958, at \vhich time the \vorking 
week at Kennecott was reduced to 4 days, thereby ma-
terially lowering the income of defendant Marrero. By 
mutual agreement bet\veen plaintiff and Marrero, the 
instalments on the note were reduced to $25 per pay 
day at said time. 'l,hese reduced payments were made 
when due by lVIarrero until April, 1959, at which time 
he filed a petition for bankruptcy in the U. S. District 
Court. On the date of said filing there was a balance 
owing on said note of $1,083.50, according to the testi-
mony of the plaintiff, to which had been added the sum 
of $156.60 interest to cover the extended period result-
ing from the decreased payments. Demand ""as then 
made by plaintiff on the defendant co-signer, Jacinto 
Rivera, for the same, and upon his failure to respond, 
court action was commenced for its collection. 
At the trial and in his pleadings, the defendant 
Rivera presented three defenses, to-wit: 
1. That the note had been paid in full. 
2. That the reduction of the instalment payments 
on the note by plaintiff 'vithout his consent or knowl-
edge relieved him, as co-signer, from liability. 
3. That usurious interest had been charged by plain-
tiff and that all interest should therefore be cancelled. 
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'fhe Court heard th case without a jury and found 
in favor of defendant on the first defense listed above, 
holding that the note had. been paid in full by ~Iarrero 
and his wife, and finding No Cause of Action against 
defendant, Rivera. The Court withheld its decision of 
Points 2 and 3. Plaintiff then presented a motion for 
a new trial which was denied. 
THE EVIDENCE 
The undisputed evidence at the trial relating to the 
payment of the note was presented by defendants 
l\Iarrero and his wife, Evangeline, who had been dis-
charged in bankruptcy. They testified that during De-
cetnber, 1958, they purchased some jewelry from plain-
tiff and borrowed from him Christmas money in the sum 
of $150.00. At that time it was agreed that the cost of 
the jewelry together with the $150.00 should be added 
to the balance owing on the old note, which Rivera had 
co-signed and that a new note should be excuted by 
Marrero and his wife without a co-signer and the old 
note returned to Marrero. Marrero and his wife then 
both signed in blank a note which was provided by 
plaintiff with the understanding that plaintiff would 
complete it and that the old note would then be re-
turned to ~Iarrero as soon as the full amount of the 
new note could be determined by plaintiff. 
On this point, Marrero testified as follows: Tr. 
P. 33, L. 18. 
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"Q., So he said the new note was to be what? 
- A. The new note and the $150 and he have to 
~figure how much the necklaces and put· it 
with the $150 and how much I owe on the 
old note, and he said the old note would be 
paid ·after he made the new one, and_he give 
me the new note for me and my wife to sign, 
in blank, and he say after Christmas he figure 
how much the necklace and the $150 and 
how much money I got in the old note, and 
put it together and give me the old note paid 
off. 
THE COURT: Say that again. 
THE ·WITNESS: lie say that after Christ-
mas he figure how much the necklace and the 
$150 and how much I owe on the old note, put 
it together, and give me the paid off-the old 
n~~ . 
. Q. Did he say what he was going to do with 
the old note? 
A. He said the old note would be all paid and he 
give it to me. 
Q. What 'vould he do? 
A. He said he give it to me after Christmas be-
cause he be busy. I told him "That's all right.'' 
THE COURT: Did you sign the new note? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
TliE COURT: Who else signed it? 
THE WITNESS: My wife. 
THE COURT: 'Vhat did the new note sav, 
when you signed it? · 
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'fHE WITNESS: He say in blank, Sir-he 
say he going to fix him up after figure up 
after Christmas. 
'fHE COURT: Thank you. That is all. 
Q. (~lr. Maw) Was anything said about Mr. 
Rivero signing the note? 
A. No, sir. He say my wife and I just on the 
new note, because I been pay my payments 
straight. 
Q. Did you ask him anything concerning anyone 
else signing? 
A. Yes. I told him I needed to bring Mr. Rivero 
to sign the new note. He say "No," just me 
and my wife would be enough. 
Q. Then what did you do with the note that you 
signed in blank'? 
A. I give it to him. He say he going to give me 
the old one after Christmas." 
(Tr. P. 35, L 4) 
''Q. Did you ever mention it to him after Christ-
mas? 
A. ''r ell, after Christmas when I go to make 
payment I asked for old note. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He say he have no time to fix it, he say maybe 
the next pay day." 
Mr. Marrero continued by stating that he asked 
for the old note on three different occasions and was 
finally told by plaintiff that he had torn the note to 
pieces and thrown it away. 
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. Mr. Marrero repeated the same account in cross-
examination. See Tr. pages 37 to 53. 
Mrs. Evangeline Lopez's account of the making 
of the new note jn payment of the old one is found in 
Tr. P. 57 and 58. 
Though the plaintiff testified in direct examination, 
in cross examination and in rebuttal, he at no time denied 
that a new note had been given in payment of the old 
one_, nor did he refute the testimony of Marrero or his 
wife regarding the same. Consequently the undisputed 
testimony shows clearly that the note sued upon had 
been paid in full by the substitution of a new note. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST POINT 
In answer to plaintiff's first point in his brief that 
the Court erred in its finding that the new note had 
replaced the old one, it seems clear that there was no 
evidence upon which the Court could have arrived at 
any other conclusion. If there had been no new note, 
certainly the plaintiff would have denied it. The fact 
that there was no denial of the several pages of testi-
mony of Marrero and his wife concerning the new note 
as a substitute for the old one co11firms the truthful-
ness of testimony of Marrero and his wife. Certainly 
their testimony cannot be brushed off, as plaintiff at-
tempts to do in his brief, 'vith a statement that "The 
testimony of Marrero, regarding a new note, does 
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not make sense." As a matter of fact, it makes good 
sense. ~Iarrero had never missed a payment on his note. 
he had reduced the principal to less than one-half of 
the original amount of the note. He borrowed money 
from plaintiff in lesser amounts on several occasions 
and had paid his debts in full. It is natural that plaintiff 
,v·ould consider him as being a good risk without a co-
signer now that the note had been reduced so greatly. 
This coupled "·ith the fact that Marrero was permanent-
ly employed at Kennecott and was able to make his 
regular payments gave plaintiff plenty of reason for 
not insisting on a co-signer. 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND POINT 
Plaintiff's second point that the Court was arbi-
trary in refusing to permit the plaintiff to reopen his 
case to offer additional testimony seems untenable on 
its face. 
The transcript shows that after the case had been 
closed and submitted on the evidence, the Court asked 
the following: 
Tr. P. 82, L. 3. 
"l\Ir. Duncan, was there any testimony from 
the plaintiff concerning the renewal note? 
~IR. DUNCAN: I think that the plaintiff de-
nied that. 
THE· COURT: I do not recall any testimony 
on that. 
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MR. DUNCAN: If there is any doubt about 
. there not being a new note, I will move to 
reopen. 
THE COURT: Motion denied." 
From the above it appears that there was no doubt 
in the Court's mind that there was a new note so there 
was no need of additional testimony to prove that there 
was. 
Certainly there is nothing in the above statements 
which in any "\\ray indicate that the Court acted arbi-
trarily in refusing at that time "\\"hen both parties had 
rested and submitted their cases, to permit the plaintiff 
to do that which he had had ample opportunities to do 
during the trial, but had deemed it undesirable to do, 
namely introduce evidence either in support or oppo-
sition of the evidence presented by defendant. 
CASES IN POINT 
The major issue before the court, which covers both 
of the point discussed in plaintiff's brief, relates to the 
proposition of whether the trial court, sitting without 
a jury, erred in denying plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial. 
This court has repeatedly held that it will not dis-
turb the de~ision of the trial court in granting or deny-
ing a new trial if there is substantial evidence to support 
its action, even though the evidence on material issues 
might be highly conflicting. 
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1\s early as the year 1881 this Court, in the case 
of .~.\Tc7.cfon vs. Brown., 2 Utah 126, stated the law as 
follows: 
''When the motion for a new trial is founded 
upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict and judgment, a large discretion is 
vested in the court below, in refusing or granting 
the motion. It must plainly appear that this dis-
cretion has been abused before the Appellate 
Court will interfere with this action in granting 
the motion on this ground.'' 
Shortly afterwards the Court, in the case of 
Davis vs. Utah Southern R.R. Co . ., 3 Utah 218, where-
in a jury had awarded judgment to the plaintiff, a 
similar statement of the law was made. In that case 
the defendant had moved for a new trial and its motion 
was granted by the trial court, whereupon the plaintiff 
appealed. 
This Court stated the law in that case as follows: 
"The appellant's proof of negligence was very 
meager and unsatisfactory, and was met by proof 
quite as strong, if not more convincing, of the 
entire absence of any negligence, unskillful, or 
reckless management of the respondent's engine 
on the occasion referred to. To say the least, the 
evidence on this point was conflicting. Where 
there is a substantial conflict of evidence on a 
material point, this court "''"ill not reverse the 
discretion exercised by the District Court in 
granting a new trial." 
From the dates of these early decisions this Court 
has consistently affirmed the actions of trial courts in 
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granting or denying motions for new trials whenever 
there was evidence in the record in support of its find-
ings. This rule was followed in the following cases: 
Utah State National Bank vs. Livingston~ 69 Utah 
284-154, P. 281; and James vs. Robertson, 117 P. 1068, 
whe~ein Justice Frick wrote on page 1073: 
"In a case where the question is whether the 
defendant was guilty of negligence or not, the 
·plaintiff need, however, merely to show a state 
of facts from which the jury may logically infer 
negligence; and if the jury believe plaintiff's 
evidence from which the inference of negligence 
may be deducted it may be, and ordinarily is, 
sufficient to sustain a :finding of negligence; and 
this is so, even if defendant disputes all of plain-
tiff's· evidence, or produces evidence from which 
the jury might find that the injury complained 
of was due to a cause or causes for which the 
defendant was not responsible." 
Justice W oolfe quoted from James vs. Robertson, 
supra, as follows in the case of King vs. Union Pacific 
R.R. Co.~ 212 P.2nd 692, on P. 694-95: 
"In cases like the one before us where all other 
assignments fail, and the only available assign-
ment is that the evidence does not justify the 
verdict of the jury, and where the trial court 
has refused to grant a new trial, all that we are 
authorized to do is look into the evidence to as-
certain whether there is any substantial evidence 
in support of every material element which 
plaintiff is required to establish in order to re-
cover. If there is such evidence, then so far as we 
are concerned, the verdict must stand, although 
10 
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in our judgment, if 've passed on the facts, the 
verdict on the 'vhole evidence should have been 
to the contrary. Nor can we under the guise of 
revie,ving an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court in refusing to grant a new trial upon the 
ground that the verdict is not supported by the 
evidence, pass upon the weight of the evidence. 
'vhat the district judge might or even should 
have done in this regard we may not do for him, 
simply because he refused to do it." 
Referring to the case of Belford vs. Allen (Okla.) 
80 P2nd 676, Justice Woolfe continued: 
"The court held that where the evidence is con-
flicting the trial judge has the duty to weigh the 
evidence and to approve or disapprove the ver-
dict, and if the verdict is such that in the opinion 
of the trial court, it should not be permitted to 
stand and it is such that he cannot conscientiously 
approve it and besides it should be for the oppo-
site party, it is his duty to set it aside for a new 
trial.'' 
From the above decisions as well as from numerous 
others rendered by this Court, it seems clear that the 
rule is 'veil established that the trial court has a wide 
discretion in the matter of deciding whether a motion 
for a new trial should be granted or denied; that it is 
the trial court 'vhich has the responsibility of weighing 
the evidence and of approving or disapproving the 
verdict; and that the appellate court will sustain its 
action on appeal if the record discloses substantial evi-
dence in support of the conclusion that has been reached 
by the trial court. 
11 
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A review of the evidence in the instant case reveals 
that all of the evidence on the issue as to whether the 
old note was paid by a new one was in the affirmative. 
In fact, though the plaintiff testified on two occasions 
during the trial-one during direct examination and 
the other in rebuttal-he presented no evidence to the 
contrary and did not deny any of the testimony pre-
sented by defendant on that issue. Nothing has been 
pointed out in plaintiff's brief which indicates in any 
way that the trial court's decision was not supported 
by substantial evidence in the record that the note sued 
upon had been paid. There is no conflicting evidence 
on the point at issue upon which the trial court rendered 
its decision for all of the testimony supports the deci-
sion of the court. 
The charge of the plaintiff that the court acted 
arbitrarily in refusing to grant his motion for a new 
trial is related in no way to the evidence of the trial, 
but is based on the refusal of the court to permit him 
to reopen the case after it had been submitted, for the 
purpose of doing what he had had numerous oppor-
tunities during the trial to do, namely present evidence 
regarding the new note. Such a refusal by the trial 
court was proper. 
C.ONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits to the court that 
before plaintiff could prevail in his appeal herein, he 
must establish from the record that the decision of the 
12 
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trial court in finding for the plaintiff and in denying 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial was unsupported by 
substantial evidel}ce; and also that the weight of the 
evidence in the record was contrary to the court's deci-
sion. This he has not done and could not do, for there 
was no testimony to support such a claim. 
HERBERT B. MAW 
Attorney for Respondent 
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